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COMMENTS ON THE 1936 SURTAX
ON UNDISTRIBUTED CORPORATE
EARNINGS
HERMAN M. KNOELLER
N this day there is a constantly growing social demand upon the
government for action to protect and promote the individual and
collective interests of its citizens. This pressing social demand is bound
to be reflected by an expanding field of governmental activity in all the
social sciences, and in the law itself.
These impelling demands made by the various interests of society
upon the present government enlarge the public functions and mani-
fest themselves in greater taxation. Comparative studies, cumulative
figures, statistical charts and graphs showing among other things the
staggering increase in national debt over a period of years, the mount-
ing annual government deficits, the alleged wild public expenditures,
and the enormous public revenues are often times not only worthless
but grossly misleading when they are not properly explained and quali-
fied from a social point of view. This is especially true when they are
judged solely from motives of profit rather than public service. All
that the fair and socially minded business man demands today is that
the necessary taxes for the administration of the government be equi-
tably apportioned among the citizens according to their ability to pay
without destroying or impeding the development of American industry.
Full sympathy exists with the view of the President regarding the
problem of the unscrupulous individual's avoidance (sometimes eva-
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sion) of his just surtaxes by withholding corporate dividends. But
the serious question is whether the new graduated surtax on the cor-
poration's undistributed earnings is a solution to this problem, or,
instead, an economically unsound principle resulting in gross injustice
when applied generally under hard and fast rules of mathematical
averages or percentages.
What are the facts? Commissioner Guy T. Helvering testified
before the Senate Finance Committee on April 30, 1936,1 in respect to
the proposed 1936 Revenue Act and submitted schedules in support
of his testimony showing the compiled net profit, reinvested current
earnings, and the ratio of the reinvested earnings to the compiled net
profits of the corporations for the years 1923 to and including 1933.
Of course, his testimony and schedules were based upon the tax
returns of the corporations reporting a net income. From an examina-
tion of the submitted schedules it appears that for 1923, 49 per cent
of the compiled net corporate profits were reinvested whereas in 1932
only four and eight-tenths per cent of the net corporate profits were
reinvested. The figures for 1933 showed a corporate compiled net
profit amounting to three billion five hundred and eighty million dol-
lars of which seven hundred and seventy-eight million dollars or
twenty-one and seven-tenths per cent were reinvested by the corpora-
tions. The average ratio of reinvested current earnings of corporations
to the compiled net corporate profits for the aforesaid eleven years
was computed at thirty and seven-tenths per cent. Great importance
was attached to this elusive figure and mathematical average.
As the 1936 Revenue Act emerged from the Conference Committee
and eventually became law2 we find therein no flat corporation tax rate
upon the distributed or undistributed net income comparable to the
average rate of the combined normal and surtax rates imposed upon
an individual stockholder if all his corporate earnings were distributed.
We find a stockholder taxable individually for dividends received at a
normal tax rate of four per cent and a surtax rate ranging from four
per cent on the first $2,000 of surtax net income in excess of $4,000
to 75 per cent on surtax net income in excess of five million dollars.
We find the corporation taxed for the very same profits represented
by the dividends later declared and paid. It is subject to a graduated
normal tax rate ranging from eight per cent to 15 per cent on the
net taxable income and (for the year in which the profits were
retained) a graduated surtax on undistributed corporate profits rang-
ing from seven per cent to 27 per cent of the portion of undistributed
1Hearings before Senate Committee on Finance on H. R. 12395, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936) 18.
249 STAT. 1648 (1936).
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net income not in excess of certain percentages of the adjusted net
income.
Curiously enough, the deception and vice existing in the foregoing
mathematical averages and percentages never seems to have been
fully realized and appreciated. The income tax is distinctively a per-
sonal tax and, as Attorney Oliphant pointed out, after all is said and
done, taxes must be paid and come out of the pockets of individuals
irrespective of the fact that they conduct their business life in a
proprietary, partnership, or corporate form. To tax the proportionate
earnings of stockholders of a corporation under a flat corporation
income tax rate regardless of each individual stockholder's true ability
to pay (measured also by income other than corporate earnings) may
often prove discriminatory and unjust when compared with the taxes
imposed upon other persons deriving their income from sources other
than dividends. To impose graduated corporate normal tax rates upon
the proportionate earnings of each stockholder, irrespective of the size
of his holdings in the corporation, increases this discrimination and
injustice. Now, to superimpose a graduated surtax upon the undis-
tributed and proportionate earnings of the stockholder regardless of
the factors mentioned above is to magnify this injustice and discrimi-
nation to an alarming degree. Just as there are often large stockholders
in small corporations so also are there many small stockholders in
large corporations. If the large stockholders, whether in the small or
large corporations, can escape paying a four per cent normal tax and
as high as a 75 per cent individual surtax by withholding the corporate
earnings and permitting the corporation to pay 27 per cent (the high-
est corporate surtax rate) on the undistributed corporate earnings,
why should they not do so? The small stockholders thereby suffer a
diminution in their proportionate corporate earnings. But this is not
all. To accentuate the discrimination and increase the injustice against
a small stockholder we now find that although a stockholder's propor-
tional earnings in a corporation have been taxed twice to the corpora-
tion (normal and surtax on undistributed profits) as, if, and when his
remaining proportional corporate earnings are distributed after the
taxable year, they are again taxable for both the normal and the surtax
on his individual income. This is double or triple taxation in its worst
form. It is injustice with a vengeance.
Now, turning to the corporation itself and its taxable income let
us inquire as to the effect of this new surtax on undistributed corporate
earnings. The modern corporation has a sort of real economic entity
and durability. It cannot count profit in terms of a year both from a
legal and an accounting long-time point of view.3 Mathematical aver-
s Arthur A. Ballantine, Hearings before Senate Contmnittee on Finance on H. R.
12395, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 434.
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ages and percentages, when applied without consideration of the eco-
nomic conditions of the time and the particular corporations affected
again prove odious and futile. This is especially true in the durable
or capital goods industries which thrive on the ephemeral peaks of
prosperity and languish in the long, deep valleys of the depression.
They are often termed the feast and famine industries. So long as the
corporation in one single, solitary year earned one dollar of profit, it
was taxable. No necessary cash exemptions whatever from the normal
tax has been allowed even the smallest corporation.
As with the past, so with the future business prospects it meant little
or nothing that lean future years confronted the corporation and the
surplus of one year might be completely absorbed in the next few years
by business losses, necessary charges for replacements, maintenance,
repair, depreciation, obsolescence, and supersession of the fixed assets
(machinery, tools, buildings, patterns, and patents). Also, the corpo-
rate surplus of one year might well be needed as working capital4 in a
growing infant industry or as a "corporate cushion" against financial
shocks in commerce. The government did not tax the average profits
of the corporations which reinvested thirty and seven-tenths per cent
of their earnings from 1923 to 1933, as testified by Commissioner
Helvering, but the profits, if any, of each successful year. It ignored
the losses that could not be offset legally against the gains. The gov-
ernment was a silent partner in every business during this period of
time, always sharing the profits but never suffering the losses. He will
now be the uninvited guest and invisible director on the board of every
private corporation casting a standing vote for the distribution of
corporate profits irrespective of the peculiar financial and economic
vicissitudes of the particular corporation.
Also, it must not be overlooked that true accounting net income
of a corporation is not its net taxable income. The tax must be paid
not from but on the corporation's net taxable income. The tax must
be paid from the true accounting net income and corporation profits."
Thus, a corporation may have no true accounting income whatsoever,
but still be forced to pay a federal tax because (a) the capital losses
of a corporation are limited to only $2,000 plus its capital gains;
(b) federal income, war profits, and gift taxes, taxes paid in foreign
countries, and other forms of taxes are unallowable tax deductions;
(c) shrinkage in market value of merchandise inventory, stocks and
bonds are not allowable tax deductions until sold or otherwise dis-
posed of; (d) bad debts suffered but not deducted in the years in
4The "working capital" of a business is the excess of its current assets over
its current liabilities, see FINNEY, 1 PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING 17.5 For legal definition of "net profits" see Warren v. King, 108 U.S. 399, 2 Sup.
Ct. 789, 27 L.ed. 769 (1883).
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which they became worthless, or, doubtful accounts receivable not
legally ascertainable to be worthless and so demonstrable within a
reasonable degree of certainty to the satisfaction of the Commissioner
are not allowable tax deductions; (e) inadequate or lost depreciation
of previous years is not an allowable tax deduction; (f) corporate
contributions are limited to certain specified types of charitable institu-
tions and are further limited to only five per cent of the net income of
the corporation as computed without the benefit of the contribution;
(g) premiums paid on any life insurance policy covering the life of
any officer or employee are not allowable deductions when the corpora-
tion is directly or indirectly beneficiary under such policy; (h) losses
from sales or exchanges of property mentioned in Section 24 of the
Revenue Act of 1936 are not deductible; (i) consolidated returns for
affiliated corporations (not railroad or railway corporations) are not
allowed, consequently; there is taxation of the profits of each subsidi-
ary without consideration of the entire corporation business as a unit
or entity and without deducting the losses sustained by the several
subsidiaries, which are often required to be organized because of
business exigencies and domestic or foreign laws.
Also, let it not be forgotten that taxes must be paid in cash and not
in any other form or medium. A corporation's surplus may often be
represented by raw materials, finished or unfinished stock, as shown
by the inventories at the close of the calendar or fiscal year. The gen-
eral conservative rule is to calculate these inventories at cost or market
price, whichever is lower. A corporation may be extremely conserva-
tive in its inventory calculations; still it may suffer a grave loss in the
valuation of its merchandise that is irretrievable under the tax laws.
No reserves for possible fluctuations in the market price of inven-
tories are allowable deductions. Likewise, a corporation's surplus may
be reflected in its accounts receivable which is subject to estimated
allowances for bad debts, in stock and bonds of uncertain or declining
market value, or, lastly, in land and buildings, tools and dies, patterns
and patents, trade marks and good will, all of which are subject to
the law of depreciation, obsolescence, and supersession. Under these
circumstances it is an extremely delicate and difficult question for hon-
est and conscientious directors of private corporations to determine
just how much of the corporate surplus should be distributed and how
much retained to cover certain but indeterminable future losses in the
business.6 To burden them with a heavy graduated surtax will not
relieve them but rather incite them to make either unwarranted distri-
butions of needed working capital, or, seeking to safeguard themselves
6 For a discussion of surplus and dividend policies in respect to corporate dis-
tributions see DEmING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1934) 604-632.
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against legal liability to the stockholders for improvident distributions,
freeze all present corporate surplus and reserves which they fear are
not replaceable except upon the payment of a heavy surtax on undis-
tributed future earnings. The surplus account and the reserves for
various contingencies of a corporation represented in cash or other
liquid assets have always proven a great financial aid during a period
of depression. They absorb the loss by which otherwise the corpora-
tion might have been forced into bankruptcy or state insolvency pro-
ceedings. They are the necessary funds upon which business men
draw in order to keep their factories open for production, to pay
wages to laborers, rent to land owners, interest upon their obligations,
profits to stockholders, and taxes to the state and the federal govern-
ments. In short, they have been aptly denominated "the life insurance
policies of business firms." Moreover, it is a flagrant weakness of our
income tax law that in times of prosperity it produces the largest
revenue and in times of depression it produces the least; thus, operat-
ing conversely to the fiscal needs of the government.
Sometimes it is said that corporate savings increase booms and
accentuate depressions by causing (a) an excessive expansion of
plant, machinery, and other capital goods, (b) an accumulation of idle
surplus funds of corporations thereby reducing the purchasing power
necessary to maintain the smooth flow of industrial products, (c) a
great increase in corporate loans to the stock market, thus augmenting
speculation. It is suggested that a substitution of the discretion of the
actual owners of the corporation-the stockholders-in place of their
directors for the management and distribution of corporate earnings
will result from the proposed corporate tax on undistributed earnings.
These arguments do not lend themselves to the support of tax legisla-
tion. They savor of regulation rather than taxation. They lead to the
destruction of the very life-blood of the many small struggling corpora-
tions because of the economic sins and social abuses of a few large
corporations in the use of their surplus funds. As well might we penal-
ize all individual savings because of the imprudent and improvident
investments of a few. As, if, and when the federal government receives
the delegated powers from the states and the people of the United States
to regulate corporate savings within the corporation and substitute the
stockholders for the board of directors of a private corporation, then
it will be timely to discuss this proposition. The avowed purpose of the
tax bill under discussion was to produce revenue and not social con-
trol of the financial depressions through the taxing powers. The means
employed must be naturally and reasonably adaptable for fiscal pur-
poses, otherwise there is no true tax. The end does not justify the
means.
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Is the theory that needed working capital can always be raised in
practice by every corporation through the sale of stock or stock rights
to its stockholders or to the public very realistic? Can a corporation
without impairing its credit position retain the current profits through
the declaration of a dividend in its own bonds, notes, or scrip? Will
the distribution of optional stock dividends, that is, one payable either
in cash or stock of the corporation at the option of the stockholder
aid the situation? The answer is emphatically in the negative. The
argument that small stockholders in small companies will have propor-
tionately more money remaining in their hands for reinvestment pur-
poses after paying their smaller income tax to the government than
the larger stockholders who pay a larger individual normal and surtax
upon dividends received is often stated in reply. This argument elimi-
nates or ignores the great outside source of corporate capital, namely,
the public, the banks, the insurance companies, the bond and mortgage
companies. Can we realistically ignore the distinction between capital
sources within and without the corporation? The answer to this argu-
ment from a stockholder's point of view is that by forcing the corpora-
tion to distribute all its earnings you also force an election upon all
the stockholders to resubscribe to new stock or exercise the stock
rights issued. Upon the failure to subscribe to new stock the relative
position of the smaller stockholder in the corporation is diminished in
proportion and in value. His failure to reinvest cannot always be
ascribed to unwillingness. If he receives a taxable dividend payable in
an obligation of the corporation or in stock where will he obtain the
cash with which to pay his income tax? Can he always sell the corpora-
tion's obligation or stock on the market? Must he not sacrifice his
proportionate interests and valuable position in the corporation by
doing so? Possibly, because of necessitous circumstances and financial
distress he cannot resubscribe to further stock in the corporation, or
sell his bond or stock dividend received, or even raise the necessary
cash to pay his income tax. Should he lose his relative position in the
corporation to wealthier stockholders or be subject to legal penalties
for not paying his income tax? Then again, suppose the dividend is
paid in cash or stock at the option of the stockholder. He is placed in
the dilemma of either accepting the cash, paying his income tax, and
suffering a loss in his relative and proportional right to the corporate
assets on dissolution, in corporate management, voting, and future
earnings, or accepting the stock with the hope of raising the tax money
somewhere and somehow.
If, on the other hand, the board of directors of a corporation
declares a 100 per cent cash dividend thereby escaping entirely the
graduated surtax on the undistributed corporate profits it may within
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the very near future be called upon to meet an unforeseen business
contingency, an acute demand for immediate capital. With its credit
position impaired by the issuance of a dividend in cash (or even in
obligations of the company) it may have great difficulty in obtaining
credit; banks will be disinclined to finance or help corporations to
rebuild or rehabilitate themselves (and thereby increase employment)
because of the poor credit and unliquid position of the corporation.
The fact that the corporation will not be entitled to any dividend
credit in respect to a contract restricting the payment of dividends in
the future because it is not contained in a written contract executed
prior to May 1, 1936, will not only affect its tax but also its credit.7
Why limit this dividend credit only to written contracts executed prior
to May 1, 1936?
So far as the stockholder himself is concerned in respect to 100
per cent cash dividends, we must consider the human factor. Once the
stockholder receives the cash in his hands he must pay his federal
income tax and, therefore, will have less to spend or reinvest. He will
realize that the corporation has already paid a normal tax and a grad-
uated surtax on the same profits; he may be greatly inclined to spend
rather than save or reinvest his money. This would be placing a pen-
alty on prudence and a bounty on improvidence. Or, this might lead
to an investment by the stockholder in tax-exempt securities and a
withdrawal of investments from productive enterprises. Furthermore,
let us not forget the existence of the speculative investor in the corpo-
ration who acquires stock with an expectation of an immediate divi-
dend and a quick turnover by an early sale of his securities at a profit.
He cares little for the continuity of the corporate enterprise from year
to year; the durability and stability of a necessary economic unit of
industry has no social value to him. Thus, a tax upon the undis-
tributed corporate earnings becomes a deterrent to the stability and
expansion of productive enterprise and may result in a serious contrac-
tion of American productive industry. It is very properly said: "The
school of thought which fosters contraction of industry by taxation is
disturbative not only of the growth of industry but of the flow of
government revenue from this source as well.""
Some corporations undoubtedly can satisfy their capital require-
ments through the sale of stock or stock rights to its stockholders or to
the public, but they are primarily the large, financially sound, and con-
trolling corporations of the country in which they have established
a strong line of credit and a long list of regular dividend payments.
7 A charter of a corporation does not constitute a written contract executed by
the corporation prior to May 1, 1936, within the meaning of Section 26(c) of
the Revenue Act of 1936. Regulations, T.D. 4674, Art. 26-3.
8Godfrey Nelson, New York Times, June 6, 1936.
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Thus, as Representative Fred M. Vinson of Kentucky pointed out9
the Americaii Telephone and Telegraph Company during the pros-
perous years from 1921 to 1930 sold stock rights amounting to nine
hundred fifty-eight million dollars and declared out in dividends but
eight hundred fifty-four million dollars, or in other words, they recov-
ered back from the sale of stock rights one hundred four million dol-
lars in excess of their dividend distributions. This same corporation
in its consolidated balance sheet as of December 31, 1935, showed an
equity in the consolidated surplus as follows, to wit: surplus reserved,
$86,043,049 and an unappropriated surplus of $268,943,306. Likewise,
Senator Henry Flood Byrd of Virginia presented to the Senate Finance
Committee ° the fact that the Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company has
an accumulated surplus of ninety-eight million dollars of which fifty-
four million is in cash and call loans and forty-two million is invested
in government securities. He further disclosed, that in 1934 the same
corporation earned twenty million dollars and paid out as dividends
sixteen million dollars.
What is there to prevent these large corporations and others in a
similar financial position from freezing their present huge surpluses
and thereafter distributing all or practically all their current earnings
in dividends and thereby escaping entirely the heavy surtax on undis-
tributed corporate earnings? Let us not forget these corporations are
but two of the few hundred giant corporations in this country with
strong credit positions fortified by years of regular dividend payments.
They do not belong to the rank and file of the five hundred thousand
corporations in the United States that Commissioner Helvering men-
tioned to the Senate Finance Committee on April 30, 1936. The "Big
Corporations" are the exclusive ten per cent of all the corporations
having far-flung interests extending into every comer of our country
and controlling 90 per cent of all the corporate business in the United
States as noted by Senators Robert M. LaFollette and Hugo L.
Black in their minority report of the Senate Finance Committee on the
Revenue Act of 1936. They are the giant combinations-the legal alter
ego-that Messrs. Berle and Means say in substance have the power to
control economic production, stifle competition, harm or help the multi-
tude of individuals, affect the whole districts, shift the currents of
trade, and bring poverty to one community and prosperity to another. =
They are truly the challenge to American economic, social, and political
9 Hearings before Cammittee on Ways and Means on H. R. 12395, 74th Cong.
2d Sess. (1936) 436.
'
0 Hearings before Senate Committee on Finance on H. R. 12395, 74th Cong.
2d Sess. (1936) 922, 923.
IBERL. AND MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1934)
44-46.
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life. Let the government use its heavy artillery to keep these powerful
corporations within check, to prevent avoidance or evasion of taxes,
to remove all semblance of economic tyranny or monopoly, to clear
the highway of trade and commerce for free competition, and the
blessings and plaudits of the American multitude will follow.
But, as intimated by Mr. May, 2 there should not be a Herod's mas-
sacre, a wide-spread slaughter of the innocent, that is, the small corpo-
rations and its stockholders, in order to reach a few offenders. In view
of this new tax on undistributed corporate profits what chance of suc-
cess have the new small corporations without a long dividend record
and an established credit against the larger corporations which in the
past have been able to build up enormous surpluses and ample reserves
free from heavy surtaxes on undistributed earnings? Can there ever
result any true competition under these circumstances? In fact, some
of these smaller corporations might easily be forced into bankruptcy
or receivership by creditors for the reason that a lower tax rate will
reduce expenditures to the extent of the tax savings.
Unquestionably, we need the new small corporation. Big business
is not always a boon to civilization, much less, to the development of
American industry. Let us not forget what Mr. Justice Brandeis of
the United States Supreme Court so vividly wrote over twenty years
ago in his brief and penetrating analysis of Big Men and Little Busi-
ness.S In reply to the argument that practically all the railroad and in-
dustrial development of this country has taken place initially through
the aid of the men of the great banking houses he stated, inter alia,
that the statement was entirely unfounded in fact. On the contrary,
he disclosed that nearly every such contribution to our comfort and
prosperity was initiated without the aid of big bankers or big finan-
ciers; the great banking houses came into relation with the early pro-
ductive enterprises either after success had been attained, or upon
reorganization after the possibility of success had been demonstrated
and the funds of the hearty pioneers, who had risked their all, were
exhausted. He cites as striking examples our early railroads, early
street railways, the automobile, the telegraph, the telephone, the wire-
less, the gas and oil, the harvesting machinery, the steel industry, the
textile, paper, and shoe industry, and nearly every other important
branch of manufacturing. It would not be surprising at this day to
find the 1936 undistributed corporate profit tax result as a boon to this
undesirable "Big Business" and as a bane to the needed new and small
corporations struggling and striving to gain a foothold in the commer-
cial world.
'2George 0. May, Hearings before Senate Comnmittee on Finance on H. R.
12395, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936) 538-549.
isBRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 88-92.
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At times it has been intimated that the 1936 undistributed corporate
profits tax was unconstitutional.' 4 The basis for this suggestion usually
is that the purpose of this act is to control private corporation policies,
dividend distributions, and corporate surpluses. This, it is rightly
claimed, is a power touching a subject not within the delegated powers
of Congress but reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.
Likewise, it is sometimes heard that the tax is so arbitrary, excessive,
and capricious as to amount to confiscation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the constitution. However, confining ourselves to the
income tax features of the 1936 Act, it seems clear from a careful
examination of the act itself, its history, and its avowed purpose to
raise permanent, additional revenue amounting to six hundred and
twenty million dollars annually, that the act is constitutional. It falls
within the federal powers of taxation. The primary purpose of the act
being for revenue the incidental motive to effect distributions of cor-
porate earnings does not vitiate the bill. Many arguments may be made
concerning the abuse of the congressional power to tax but such argu-
ments cannot, and do not legally challenge or deny its existence. The
regulations adopted in the act seem to be quite naturally and reason-
ably adapted for the administration, collection, and enforcement of the
-tax. There is no elaborate and detailed plan of regulation comparable
to that contained in the unconstitutional Child Labor Act of 1918.Y
Nor is there an expropriation of funds for a particular group as con-
,demned in the Hoosac Mills Case." Furthermore, it must not be for-
.gotten there is such a substantial difference between a business carried
-on as a corporation and one carried on as a partnership or proprietor-
ship as to justify a separate and reasonable classification for federal
-taxation. A federal excise tax upon private corporations chartered
under state authority is not an infraction of the general power of the
,states to authorize the formation of corporations; nor does the mere
fact that the private corporation is a creature of the state exempt it
.or its franchises from the exercise of the federal authority to levy
.excise taxes.l?
The argument claiming that the 1936 Income Tax violates the Fifth
Amendment in that it takes property without due process of law like-
wise is untenable. This limitation, if it can be called one, upon the
federal powers of taxation is rarely invoked successfully when the sub-
14 Joseph 3. Klein, Hearings before Senate Committee on Finance on H. R.
12395, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936) 108-109; George T. Evans, Hearings before
Senate Comnmnittee on Finance on H. R. 12395, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936)
439, 440.
IS Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L.ed. 101 (1918).
16United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 80 L.ed. 477 (1936).
-T7 See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 117, 31 Sup Ct. 342, 55 L.ed. 389(1911) ; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L.ed. 482 (1869).
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ject taxed is within the taxing powers of Congress; secondly, the legis-
lative act must upon its face be so arbitrary as to compel the conclu-
sion that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing power but con-
stitutes in substance and effect the true exertion of a different forbid-
den power, as, for example, the confiscation, expropriation, or spolia-
tion of property. Thus, it is only in an extreme case when Congress
glaringly disregards fair dealing and instead of taxing, really confis-
cates property, that it can be said there is a violation of the Fifth
Amendment. This can hardly be said of the 1936 Revenue Act,
especially so far as the income tax features are concerned.
The courts, it is believed, will hold that the amount and the rate
of the excise tax is a matter of Congressional policy or legislative
discretion and that petitions for relief from high and oppressive taxes
must be addressed to the legislative and not the judicial branch of the
government. The required uniformity of an excise tax on private cor-
porations does not call for the equal application of the tax to all per-
sons or corporations who may come within its operation but is limited
to a geographical uniformity throughout the United States? Conse-
quently, it is respectfully submitted that, with the presumption of con-
stitutionality to fortify it in case of any court attack, the Revenue Act
of 1936, especially so far as its income tax features are concerned, will
prove legally invulnerable and violative of neither the Fifth nor the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution?
CORPORATE INCOME AND STOCKHOIDERS' INCOME
Now turning our attention more particularly to the nature of cor-
poration income and the stockholders' rights thereto we find within
the recent past that two theories have been suggested for establishing
more of an equality in taxation. One of the theories is to extend the
provisions of Section 102 of the 1936 Revenue Act relating to the sur-
tax on corporations improperly accumulating surplus to the surtax on
undistributed corporate profits. Section 102 (a) of the new act pro-
vides in substance that the corporate surtax on improperly accumulated
surplus shall not be applied against the corporation if all the share-
holders of the corporation include in their gross income their entire
pro rata shares of the retained net income of the corporation, and if
90 per cent or more of such retained net income is so included in the
gross income of shareholders other than corporations. It is to be
observed that the tax under Section 102 is levied against the corpora-
tion and not the individual stockholders. Furthermore, it is entirely
3s Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., supra note 17.19 In Kingan & Co. v. Smith, 17 F. Supp. 217 (D.C. Ind., 1936) it was held that
the "windfall tax" of the Act of 1936 was neither a penalty nor an arbitrary
exaction.
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optional with the specified shareholders whether or not they will
relieve the corporation of this surtax by including it in their individual
returns. Because of the option so given this section is distinctively
different from the tax requirements in relation to partners and partner-
ships. The law requires that there be included in computing the net
income of each partner his distributive share, whether distributed or
not, of the net income of the partnership' for the taxable year.F0 There
is no federal income tax levied against the partnership, as such. It is,
therefore, readily seen that there is no existing analogy between corpo-
ration income and partnership income from a tax point of view. The
suggested theory gives rise to grave questions as to the constitutional
taxing powers of Congress, the limitations thereon, the corporate per-
sonality, the distinction between capital and income, and the practica-
bility of the entire plan. These questions will be examined after the
presentation of a second and cognate theory now gaining considerable
support.
Another theory advanced is to disregard the corporate entity en-
tirely and to tax the undistributed profits of corporations as though
"constructively received" by the stockholders?' Section 42 of the 1936
Revenue Act, provides that the amount of all items of gross income
is to be included in the gross income for the taxable year in which
received by the taxpayer, unless, under methods of accounting per-
mitted under Section 41, any such amounts are to be properly accounted
for as of a different period. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
pursuant to law, has provided in his compiled regulations for the con-
structive receipt theory in respect to income. ' It is therein stated that
income which is credited to the account of or set apart for a taxpayer
and which may be drawn upon by him at any time is subject to the tax
for the year during which so credited or set apart, although not then
actually reduced to possession. To constitute receipt in such a case the
income must be credited or set apart to the taxpayer without any sub-
stantial limitations or restriction as to the time or manner of payment
or condition upon which payment is to be made, and must be made
available to him so that it may be drawn at any time and its receipt
brought within his own control and disposition. As examples of con-
structive receipt it is indicated that if interest coupons have matured
and are payable, but have not -been cashed, such interest though not
collected when due and payable shall be included in gross income for
the year during which the coupons mature, unless it can be shown that
there are no funds available for payment of the interest during such
20 Section 182 of the Revenue Act of 1936; Regulations T. D. 94, Art. 192-1.
Sherman, Note, 13 TAx MAGAZINE 19.
22 Regulations, T. D. 94, Art. 42-2, 42-3.
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year. Also, dividends on corporate stock, it is said, are subject to tax
when unqualifiedly made subject to the demand of the shareholder:
interest credited on savings bank deposits even though the bank nomi-
nally has a rule, seldom or never enforced, that it may require so many
days' notice before withdrawals are permitted, is income to the deposi-
tor when credited. An amount credited to shareholders of a building
and loan association, when such credit passes without restriction to the
shareholder, has a taxable status as income for the year of the credit,
but if the amount of such accumulations does not become available to
the shareholder until the maturity of a share, the amount of any share
in excess of the aggregate amount paid in by the shareholder is in-
come for the year of the maturity of the share.
Now, in examining the aforesaid two theories and their application
to federal taxation of stockholders in respect to the undistributed cor-
porate profits we must, perforce, revert to fundamental principles of
the power of taxation. We find that Congress has only such powers
that have been delegated to it expressly or impliedly. We know that the
Sixteenth Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing
clauses of the original constitution and the effect attributed to them
before the amendment was adopted. Prior to the Sixteenth Amend-
ment, it was held that taxes upon rents and profits of real estate and
upon returns from investment of personal property were, in effect,
direct taxes upon the property from which such income arose, and
were imposed by reason of ownership, and that Congress could not
impose such taxes without apportioning them among the states accord-
ing to population as required by Article 1, Paragraph 2, Clause 3, and
Paragraph 9, Clause 4, of the original constitution. We also found that
the Sixteenth Amendment, adopted February 25, 1913, provided that
Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on "incomes,"
from whatever source derived without apportionment among the sev-
eral states and without regard to any census or enumeration. This
amendment did not extend the taxing power to new subjects but
merely removed the necessity which otherwise might exist for an
apportionment among the states of taxes laid on income. In order,
therefore, that the clause above cited from Article 1 of the constitu-
tion may have proper force and effect, save only as modified by the
Sixteenth Amendment and that the latter also may have proper effect,
it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is not
"income" as the term is therein used. We must apply the distinction
according to truth and substance and without regard to form. Congress
cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter since it can-
not by legislation alter the constitution from which alone it derives
the power to legislate and within whose limitations alone that power
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can be lawfully exercised?2 Not only is it necessary to define income,
but it is also necessary to distinguish it from capital. Furthermore, we
must ascertain the true nature of a corporation, when the corporate
veil will be pierced for tax purposes, when income belongs to the cor-
poration, and when it is severed and realized by the stockholder so as
to make the same taxable to him.
A great deal of learning has been expended and exhausted on the
true definition of income, and, it is said, the further we pursue the
subject, the more difficult the definition becomes. However, it is not
necessary for us to indulge at great length in any philosophic or eco-
nomic distinctions. Money income to an economist is essentially psy-
chic; in other words, it resolves itself into the unfree utilities which
the money indirectly and the goods directly through the benefits they
render, afford, or control 4 Generally, economic income is regarded
as a flow of human satisfactions over a period of time, which may be
long or short, regular or irregular, recurring or non-recurring. It is
sufficient, for our purposes, simply to observe the fact that there is no
unanimity in the opinions of economists as to just what are the neces-
sary elements contained in the concept of income.
To the accountant income is the money value of the flow of eco-
nomic goods or human-want satisfiers during a fixed period of time,
usually a year, that is, the increase of a recipient's economic power
between the beginning and the end of the accounting or tax period.
The profits of a corporation are cautiously segregated by the account-
ant into realized profits arising out of business sales or exchanges in
which the value received is greater than the value parted with, and
unrealized profits, representing mere increases in the value of the
property due to market conditions, unattended by actual sales or ex-
changes. The accountant further differentiates between operating
profits representing those gains derived from the sale of the commod-
ity in which the business normally deals and extraneous profits made
by sale of assets owned but not regularly dealt in by the corporation.2 6
Now, the legal distinction between capital and income is of the
gravest importance because Congress may tax only "income" without
apportionment by virtue of the Sixteenth Amendment; it may not tax
"capital" without complying with the constitutional rule of apportion-
ment. Moreover, the federal government has not the freedom in taxa-
tion as possessed by the states or the English Parliament; the state
decisions and the English cases merely present questions of statutory
construction and, consequently, cannot act as precedents for the guid-
2 3 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L.ed. 521 (1920).
24 DAVENPoRT, THE EcoNoMIcs oF ENTERPRISE 488.2 5 K LEIN, FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION (1929) 47.
26 FINNEY, 1 PRINcIPLEs OF AcCOUNTING 1, 2.
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ance of the United States Supreme Court testing an act of Congress
by the limitations of a written constitution having superior force. The
federal Supreme Court's definition of income emphasizes the attributes
of severability and realization. Thus, it is said: "Income may be de-
fined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both com-
bined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through the
sale or conversion of capital assets. . . . Here we have the essential
matter; not a gain accruing to capital, not a growth or increment of
value in the investment, but a gain, profit, something of exchangeable
value proceeding from the property, severed from the capital however
invested or employed, and coming in, being derived, that is, received
or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, bene-
fit, and disposal; that is, income derived from property. Nothing else
answers the description."-" In determining the legal definition of the
word "income" the court has consistently refused to enter into the
refinements of lexicographers or economists and has approved the
aforesaid definition on the ground that it is believed to be the com-
monly understood meaning of the term which must have been in the
minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to
the constitution. s Taxation is eminently practical and is, in effect,
brought to every man's door; for the purpose of deciding upon its
validity, a tax should be regarded in its actual, practical results rather
than with reference to those theoretical or abstract ideas whose cor-
rectness is the subject of dispute and contradiction among those who
are experts in the science of political economy.2 9 The latest court defi-
nition of income was stated by Justice Cardozo as follows: "Income
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment is the fruit that is
born of capital, not the potency of fruition. With few exceptions, if
any, it is income as the word is known in the common speech of man;
when it is that, it may be taxed though it was in the making long
before."s0
In considering the above-mentioned legal income of a taxpayer
it is imperative that a distinction be made between the income belong-
ing to the corporation as a separate legal entity and the income of the
stockholders who have a beneficial and equitable interest in the assets
of the corporation as reflected in the certificates of stock issued by the
- Mr. Justice Pitney in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207, 40 Sup. Ct. 189,
64 L.ed. 521 (1920); see also Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 38
Sup. Ct. 467, 62 L.ed. 1054 (1918); Stratton's Independence v. Hawbert, 231
U.S. 399, 415, 34 Sup. Ct. 136, 58 L.ed. 285 (1913).
28Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519, 41 Sup. Ct. 386,
65 L.ed. 751 (1921).
29 Mr. Justice Peckham in Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515, 516, 19 Sup. Ct.
522, 43 L.ed. 786 (1899).
30 United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 99, 56 Sup.
Ct. 353, 80 L.ed. 500 (1936).
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corporation. This calls for a clear concept of the term "corporation."
In America at a very early date Chief Justice John Marshall in one of
the many famous cases then coming before the United States Supreme
Court defined a corporation as "an artificial being invisible, intangible,
and existing only in the contemplation of law; being the mere creature
of the law it possesses only those properties which the charter of its
creation confers upon it either expressly or as an incidental to its very
existence." 3' The foregoing concept of a corporation is now considered
the orthodox or old view. The rapidly gaining modern view conceives
incorporation as an act creating a corporate legal personality of the
members rather than a corporate legal person which is separate and
apart from the members. Legal personality is said to be the sum total
of the rights and the obligations attributed to a legal person in a given
capacity or legal relation whereas corporate personality signifies the
sum total of the rights and the obligations which the members have in
their distinct corporate capacity.3
For the purposes of federal taxation the term corporation is not
limited to the artificial entity usually known as a corporation but in-
cludes also associations, joint stock companies, and insurance compan-
ies.3 3 The subjection of the so-called Massachusetts Trust, certain lim-
ited partnerships, joint stock companies and associations to taxes
applicable to corporations has had a very interesting legal history.4
Since the decision in Hecht v. Malley,'- the applicability of federal
corporation taxes to business trusts has generally neither been success-
fully assailed nor seriously questioned. Thus, the term "association"
contained in the recent revenue acts has been held to embrace business
trusts in almost every variety and form.3 The Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue in his latest publication of the Regulations on the 1936
Income Tax Law states that the term "association" is not used in the
act in any narrow or technical sense, but includes any organization
created for the transaction of designated affairs or the attainment of
- Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636, 4 L.ed. 629 (1819).
STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1936) 9.
- Section 1001 (a)-2, Revenue Act of 1936.
Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U.S. 178, 31 Sup. Ct. 360, 54 L.ed. 424 (1911) ; Crocker
v. Malley, 249 U.S. 223, 39 Sup. Ct. 270, 63 L.ed. 573 (1919) ; Hecht v. Malley,
265 U.S. 144, 44 Sup. Ct. 462, 68 L.ed. 949 (1924).3 5 Hecht v. Malley, supra n. 34. 1
Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n. v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 46 Sup. Ct. 48, 70 L.ed.
183 (1925); Little Faun Oil & Gas Co. v. Lewellyn, 29 F. (2d) 137 (W.D.
Penn. 1928); White Y. Hornblower, 27 F. (2d) 777 (C.C.A. 1st, 1928); Swan-
son v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 296 U.S. 362, 56 Sup. Ct. 283, 80
L.ed. 273 (1935).
- Morrissey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 296 U.S. 344, 56 Sup. Ct.
289, 80 L.ed. 263 (1935); Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365, 56 Sup. Ct. 287,
80 Led. 675 (1935); Helvering v. Colman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U.S. 369,
56 Sup. Ct. 285, 80 L.ed. 278 (1935) ; Commissioner v. Vandergrift Realty &
Investment Co., 82 F. (2d) 387 (C.C.A. 9th, 1936).
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some object which, like a corporation, continues notwithstanding that
its members or participants change and the affairs of which like corpo-
rate affairs are conducted by a single individual, a committee, a board,
or some other group, acting in a representative capacity.' s It is imma-
terial whether such an organization is created by an agreement, a
declaration of trust, a statute or otherwise.
Now, just how far can we go in piercing the corporate veil so as to
disregard the corporate entity for tax purposes and call corporation in-
come the stockholders' income? An excellent general rule has been
offered, to wit: "For all business transactions consistent with the spirit
and purpose of corporation laws, the corporate personality of persons
who have associated under those laws must be recognized; on the other
hand, their corporate personality will not be recognized when to do so
would run counter to the purpose which prompted the establishment
of the corporate device or when the conflicting rights and obligations
in litigation can be more fairly adjusted by ignoring the corporate per-
sonality.""0 The courts have generally stated that the corporate form
will be disregarded (1) when necessary to prevent fraud, (2) when a
corporation is so organized and controlled as to make it merely an
instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation for a sinister or
wrongful purpose or to work injustice.40 It has also been held that if
any general rule can be laid down in the present state of authority,
it is that a corporation will be looked upon as a corporate entity as a
general rule and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but
when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons.4'
Probably the strongest expression used by the United States
Supreme Court in sustaining the corporate entity theory is found in
the opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney in the famous case of Eisner v.
Macomber when he said: "We have no doubt of the power or duty of
a court to look through the form of a corporation and determine the
question of the stockholder's rights, in order to ascertain whether he
has received income taxable by Congress without apportionment. But,
looking through that form, we cannot disregard the essential truth dis-
closed; ignore the substantial difference between the corporation and
the stockholder; treat the entire organization as unreal; look upon
stockholders as partners when they are not such; treat them as having
- Regulations, T. D. 94, Art. 1001-2.
39 STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1936) 16.
40 Pittsburgh & Buffalo Co. v. Duncan, 232 Fed. 584 (C.C.A. 6th, 1916).
4' United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247 (C.C. E.D.
Wis. 1905); see also Buick Motor Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 43 F. (2d) 385
(E.D. Wis. 1930) ; Note (1932) 7 Wis. L. REv. 250; Finkelstein, The Corporate
Entity and the Income Tax (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 436.
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an equity, a right to a partition of the corporate assets, when they
have none; and indulge in the fiction that they have received and real-
ized a share of the profits of the company which, in truth, they have
neither received nor realized. We must treat the corporation as a sub-
stantial entity separate from the stockholders, not only because such is
the practical effect, but because it is only by recognizing such separate-
ness that any dividend-even one paid in money or property-can be
regarded as income of the stockholders. Did we regard the corporation
and the stockholders as altogether identical, there would be no in-
come except as the corporation acquired it; and while this would be
taxable against the corporation as income under appropriate provisions
of law, the individual stockholders could not be separately and addi-
tionally taxed with respect to their several shares even when divided,
since, if there were entire identity between them and the company they
could not be regarded as receiving anything from it, any more than
if one's money were to be removed from one pocket to another."' '
In accordance with the above-mentioned principles the Board of
Tax Appeals has formulated the rule that if a corporation is formed
in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's business and for the purpose
of serving the proper ends of its commercial activity, then the corpo-
ration entity will be respected; but if the corporation is formed when
the shadow of the* tax hovers over the taxpayer and in a last-minute
attempt to avoid its blow, then the law will ignore the legal fiction of
the corporate person.4 3
Consequently, with rare exceptions, the corporation property has
been considered separate and distinct from the property of the sev-
eral stockholders. In 1870, it is true, the Supreme Court did decide
that under the Revenue Act of 1864, the gains and profits of all com-
panies, whether corporation or partnership, should be included in esti-
mating the annual gains, profits, or income of any person entitled to
the same, whether distributed or not, that an individual, therefore;
was taxable upon his proportion of the earnings of a corporation
although the profits had not been declared as dividends and although
invested in assets not in their nature divisible. However, it was later
held that insofar as the aforesaid case seems to uphold the right of
Congress to tax without apportionment a stockholder's interest in
accumulated earnings prior to the declaration of dividend it must be
regarded as over-ruled ,s since the Sixteenth Amendment applies only
to income what is called the stockholder's share in the accumulated
profits of the company is capital and not income.
42Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 213, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L.ed. 521 (1920).
In re George H. Chisholm, 29 B. T. A. 1334.
Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1, 20 L.ed. 272 (1870).
45 Eisner v. Macomber, supra, note 42, at 208.
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So, under the modem theory corporate property is the joint prop-
erty owned by the shareholders in their corporate personality, and
corporate rights and obligations are the joint rights and obligations of
the shareholders in their corporate personality." The authority of the
board of directors over the ordinary business of a corporation is nor-
mally exclusive and free from interference or control by a majority
of the stockholders; this is because all the shareholders have agreed
by their contract of membership to concentrate control and corporate
management in a duly elected board of directors, not in a majority of
the shareholders. Thus, even a majority of the shareholders may not
interfere with the corporate control, or override the action taken by the
board when acting within the scope of authority conferred upon it.47
According to the corporate scheme of association, the power of man-
agement vested in the board of directors includes the authority to deter-
mine whether, when the corporation has a surplus, a dividend shall
be declared and, if declared, how much it shall be and when and how
it shall be payable. It does not follow, however, that a shareholder
may not secure judicial review of directorate action, with a view to
nullification, if it can be shown to be the result of a decision arbitrarily
arrived at, in contravention of the shareholder's contract rights, or
-without proper consideration of the interest of all the shareholders.s
But, the mere existence of a large surplus is not in itself enough to
justify a court in ordering the declaration of a dividend.49
Now, if the assets, the surplus, and the earnings of a corporation
in the first instance and before the declaration of a dividend belong
entirely to the corporation as a separate and distinct legal entity and
the corporate veil will not be pierced except to prevent fraud in taxa-
tion or otherwise, just when thereafter do the earnings and the prop-
.erty of a corporation become severed and realizable to the stockholder
.so as to become taxable as income to the stockholder? Is every receipt
of a dividend whether in cash or otherwise taxable? These are diffi-
-cult and delicate questions to answer.
The courts strive to draw a line between capital and incomeO and
insist that the undivided corporate profits of a corporation do not con-
stitute income to the stockholder until there is a separation and a
46 STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1936) 65, 71.
4 STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORIORATIONS (1936) 548, 549;
Bloom v. Vehon Co., 331 Ill. 200, 173 N.E. 270 (1930); Automatic Syndicate
Co. v. Cunningham [1906] 2 Ch. 34.
43 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 240 Mich. 549, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
-49 In Trimble v. American Sugar Refining Co., 61 N. J. Eq. 340, 48 Atl. 912
(1901), the court refused to order the declaration of a dividend where a sur-
plus of sixty million dollars was only six per cent of the capital stock
-5 See Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 38 Sup. Ct. 467, 62 L.ed. 1054
(1918) ; Hays v. Gauley Coal Co., 247 U.S. 189, 38 Sup. Ct. 470, 62 L.ed. 1061
(1918).
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realization thereof by the stockholder.5l Let us first examine dividends
other than true stock dividends and then stock dividends.
The mere accretion in value of a stockholder's investment does not
constitute income but there must be some change in the form, quality,
or extent of the taxpayer's investment. Thus, where the market value
of a stockholder's share in a corporation organized prior to March 1,
1913, had increased to twice the par value of his stock on March 1,
1913 (when the Revenue Act of 1913 took effect) and afterwards the
corporation sold all its property making a final distribution of the pro-
ceeds to the shareholders on surrender of their stock certificates and
paying each stockholder twice the par value of his stock, it was held
that the value thus received by the stockholder in excess of the par
value of his stock was not "income, gains, or profits" of the share-
holder but capital and, therefore, it was not subject to the income tax;
the value received represented merely a conversion of the stock-
holder's existing investment; furthermore, the gain did not "arise"
or "accrue" after the act became effective.* In other words, a single
and final dividend in liquidation of the entire assets and business of a
corporation and a return to a stockholder of the value of his stock
upon the surrender of his entire interests in the company at a price
that represented the stock's intrinsic value at and before March 1,
1913, was not taxable income but capital of the stockholder. Similarly,
upon the cancellation of an insurance policy the amount realized by
the insured over and above the premiums paid and attributable to and
accrued during the period before March 1, 1913, must be deemed an
accretion to capital and not taxable as IncomeP
On the other hand, where cash dividends were declared and paid
not in liquidation but in the ordinary course of business by a corpora-
tion to its shareholders after March 1, 1913, whether from current
earnings or from a surplus accumulated before that date, they were
held taxable as income to the individual shareholders under the Rev-
enue Act of 19 13.*4
In the more recent income tax acts provisions have been inserted
for the purpose of excluding from the effects of the tax any dividends
declared out of earnings or profits that accrued prior to March 1, 1913.
This originated with the act of September 8, 1916, and was granted
as a "concession to the equity of stockholders."s a On the very same
day that Lynch v. Hornby was decided the Supreme Court also held
Magill, Realization of Income Through Corporate Distributions (1931) 31
COL. L. REv. 519.
&2 Lynch v. Turras, 247 U.S. 221, 38 Sup. Ct. 537, 60 L.ed. 1087 (1918).
53 Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 49 Sup. Ct. 426, 73 L.ed. 851 (1929).
5i Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 38 Sup. Ct. 543, 62 L.ed. 1149 (1918).
4a United States v. Safety Car Heating Co., 297 U.S. 88, 96, 56 Sup. Ct 353,
80 L.ed. 500 (1936).
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
that a dividend by a corporation of shares owned by it in another
corporation was not a true stock dividend and was subject to the tax
like an equivalent distribution of money or other property.5
Gains realized by stock fire insurance companies from sale or other
disposition of property accruing after March 1, 1913, were taxable as
income, for the tax being upon "realized gain" it may constitutionally
be imposed upon the entire amount of the gain realized within the
taxable period even though some of it represents enhanced value in an
earlier period before the adoption of the 1918 taxing act. 6 In this last-
mentioned case Mr. Justice Stone stated that the "realization of the
gain is the event which calls into operation the taxing act, although
part of the profit realized in one accounting period may have been due
to increase of value in an earlier one."' '
The tendency to look upon March 1, 1913, as fixing a point of time
when claims of every kind no matter how contingent became trans-
muted into capital at least for taxing purposes was recently con-
demned by the United States Supreme Court. The contrary idea, with
few exceptions, was held the correct one, to wit: "That every form of
income accruing fully and unconditionally after February, 1913, shall
contribute to the Treasury, though it had a potential existence for
years before its capacity to fructify."5 8 In the last-cited case the Treas-
ury Regulations classifying claims that existed unconditionally (as dis-
tinguished from those conditionally or contingently existing) on March
1, 1913, as non-taxable was approved; consequently, the claim of a
patent owner against an infringer for damages like the claim of
accounting for profits, although existing prior to March 1, 1913, was
too contingent and conditional as of that date to be considered capital,
so that when the infringement suit was thereafter settled (subsequent
to March 1, 1913) the entire amount received in compromise was in-
come and so taxable.59 Also, where a corporation had a surplus on
March 1, 1913, but in the subsequent years suffered yearly losses and
then again enjoyed yearly profits it was held that the subsequent yearly
losses could not be charged against the subsequent profits but the
losses must be deducted from the surplus of March 1, 1913, in deter-
mining the amount of dividends exempt from federal income tax under
the 1921 Revenue Act.6 0
55 Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U.S. 347, 38 Sup. Ct. 546, 62 L.ed. 1152 (1918).
56 MacLaughlin v. Alliance Insurance Co., 286 U.S. 244, 52 Sup. Ct. 538, 76 L.ed.
1083 (1932).
57MacLaughlin v. Alliance Insurance Co., supra note 56 at p. 249.
5 United States v. Safety Car Heating Co., 297 U.S. 88, 96, 56 Sup. Ct. 353,
80 L.ed. 500 (1936).
United States v. Safety Car Heating Co., supra note 58.
60 Helvering v. Canfield, 291 U.S. 163, 54 Sup. Ct. 368, 78 L.ed. 706 (1934).
When dividend checks are mailed by the corporation in one year and received
by the shareholder in a subsequent year they are taxable as income under the
1924 and 1928 Acts for the calendar year when received by shareholder. See
Avery v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 210, 54 Sup. Ct. 674, 78 L.ed. 1216 (1934).
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In respect to the taxability of stock dividends as income to the
stockholders, long and bitter legal contests have been waged. Some of
the best legal talent in the country, including Charles E. Hughes,
George W. Wickersham, Albert M. Kales, and W. C. Herron, partici-
pated as attorneys and counsellors in the judicial determination of this
perplexing problem. The original case upon which all the tax cases
with reference to stock dividends are based is, undoubtedly, that of
Gibbons v. Mahong' in which it was held that as between a life tenant
and a remainder-man under an equitable trust created by will a stock
dividend was not income but an accretion to capital; that only the
income from a stock dividend was payable to the tenant for life, not
the stock dividend itself. The stock dividend, it was said, really took
nothing from the property of the corporation and added nothing to the
interest of the shareholders; the only change was in the evidence which
represented that interest, namely, the new shares and the original share
together representing the same proportional interest that the original
shares represented before the issue of the new shares.
Thereafter, it was held that the value of new shares of a corpora-
tion issued and distributed as a stock dividend on December 26, 1913,
but representing surplus profits earned before January 1, 1913, and
transferred to the capital account, was not taxable to the shareholders
as income.62 The same legal reasoning used in the said Gibbons case
applied, although the Attorney General sought to draw a distinction
between the proper construction to be placed on an equitable trust
created under a will and a tax statute created by Congressional act.
Now, unlike the Revenue Act of 1913, the Revenue Act of 1916
expressly provided that stock dividends should be considered income
to the amount of their cash value. Accordingly, the government sought
to collect income tax on a fifty per cent stock dividend declared by the
Standard Oil Company of California from surplus earned between
March 1, 1913, and January 1, 1916. The United States Supreme Court
held that Congress could not by any definition it may adopt conclude
the matter as to what is or what is not income within the meaning of
the Sixteenth Amendment since it cannot by legislation alter the con-
stitution from which alone it derived its power to legislate ;63 conse-
quently, a stock dividend was not income within the Sixteenth Amend-
ment merely because it was so declared by Congress. A stock dividend,
it was said, merely evinced a transfer of an accumulated surplus to
the capital account of the corporation, took nothing from the property
of the corporation and added nothing to that of the shareholder; a
tax on such dividends was a tax on capital and not on income; and,
- Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549, 10 Sup. Ct. 1057, 34 L.ed. 525 (1890).62 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 38 Sup. Ct. 158, 62 L.ed. 372 (1920).
83 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L.ed. 521 (1920).
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therefore, was invalid without apportionment under the constitution.
Of course, the same legal reasoning does not apply to a dividend of
shares owned by one corporation in another corporation as this type
of dividend distribution is not a true stock dividend but is equivalent
to a distribution of money."
Income being judicially defined by the aforesaid cases as a gain
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, including
profits gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, it was,
quite logically, held in 1921 that this included a gain from capital
realized by a single, isolated sale of property held as an investment
as well as profits realized by sales in a business of buying and selling
such property." In this last-mentioned case the court definitely refused
to follow the economic theory holding income to be a flow of economic
goods over a period of time and possessing the essential attribute of
"recurrence."
The last expression from the United States Supreme Court as to
whether stock dividends are taxable as income in the hands of the
shareholders was rendered on May 18, 1936. It was decided in the case
of Koshland v. Helvering" that where a stock dividend gives to the
stockholder an interest different from that which his former stock-
holdings represent, he receives income within the meaning of the Six-
teenth Amendment; consequently, where common voting shares of a
corporation were received by the holder of cumulative preferred shares
as a dividend they were not to be treated as returns of capital but
taxable income to the stockholder. The court through Mr. justice
Roberts in the last-mentioned case distinguished the earlier stock divi-
dend cases in which the dividend was held not to be income by stating:
"Under our decisions the payment of a dividend of new common
shares conferring no different rights or interests than did the old,-
the new certificates, plus the old, representing the same proportionate
interest in the net assets of the corporation as did the old,-does not
constitute the receipt of income by the stockholder."" In analyzing
this last decision of the Supreme Court in relation to stock dividends,
it will be noticed that the crux of the decision lies in the fact that the
stock dividend gave the stockholder an interest different from that
which his former stockholdings represented. Query, where a corpora-
tion has only common stock and no preferred stock outstanding and
the directors declare from accumulated corporate surplus a dividend to
6Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U.S. 347, 38 Sup. Ct. 546, 62 L.ed. 1152 (1918).
65 Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 41 Sup. Ct. 386,
65 L.ed. 751 (1921). See also Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 49 Sup. Ct. 199,
73 L.ed. 460 (1929), recognizing the right of Congress to fix the value of a
gift in the hands of the donee at the price paid by the donor.
6Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 56 Sup. Ct. 767, 80 L.ed. 1268 (1936).
6 Koshland v. Helvering, supra note 66 at page 445.
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the common stockholder payable in newly created preferred stock is it
a taxable dividend? The same voting rights, management, and control
in the corporation are retained. True, the investment is now different
in form but the ownership in the corporate assets-the substance there-
of-is the same. The new certificates plus the old certificates represent
the same proportionate interest in the net assets as did the old com-
mon stock certificates before the preferred stock dividend was declared.
Under these facts and circumstances can it be said legally and logically
that the stockholder has received an interest different from that which
his former stockholdings represent thus constituting income within the
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment? This and cognate problems
have not been decided by the United States Supreme Court. How-
ever, in summarizing the stock dividend cases it seems very logical
that where both common and preferred stock are outstanding a divi-
dend of common shares on common stock is tax exempt to the stock-
holder ;6 a dividend of common shares on preferred stock is taxable
to the stockholder ;9 a dividend of preferred shares on common stock
is taxable to the shareholder ;-7O a dividend of preferred shares on pre-
ferred stock is or is not taxable income to the stockholder depending
upon the possible difference in rights or proportional interest obtained
by the stockholder, but where only common stock is outstanding a
dividend of new preferred shares on the common stock is not taxable
to the stockholder, for after the distribution the stockholder has the
same proportionate interest in the corporation as he had previous to
the dividend so declared.7
So far as stock rights are concerned a parity of reasoning has been
applied as that used in the stock dividend cases. Where stock rights
covering its own stock are issued by a corporation to the stockholder
by way of a dividend, said stock rights do not constitute taxable income
in the hands of the stockholder until income is realized by a sale thereof
by him. 2 However, where a stockholder of a corporation receives
through dividends certain warrants to subscribe to stock either of a
different class in the same corporation or any stock in a different corpo-
ration, to the extent he acquires greater rights or "different interests"
he receives taxable income. Thus, a taxable dividend was received to
the extent that the market value of the stock, as to which the stock
rights were issued, exceeded the price payable therefor where a stock-
holder of one corporation received warrants to subscribe at less than
68 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L.ed. 521 (1920).
69 Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 56 Sup. Ct. 767, 80 L.ed. 1268 (1936);
Tillotson Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 27 B. T. A. 913 (1933).
70 Torrens v. Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 787 (1934).
71 Harriman v. Commissioner, 34 B. T. A. 180 (1936).
72 Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 259 U.S. 247, 42 Sup. Ct. 483, 66 L.ed. 923
(1922).
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current market prices for stock in another corporation; and, "the date
of receipt of the warrant" by the stockholder is the day for deter-
mining its value7 3
In concluding it is submitted, in view of the fact that the courts
will respect the corporate personality or the separate legal entity of
the corporation for tax purposes unless it becomes clear that the fiction
is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud,
defend crime, or evade the payment of taxes by setting up corporate
instrumentalities or adjuncts for sinister reasons, the suggestion of
taxing stockholders personally for the undistributed corporate profits,
whether under the constructive receipt theory or otherwise, is legally
fatal on constitutional grounds. The matter taxed is not "income" to
the stockholder within the terms of the Sixteenth Amendment as deter-
mined by the above-mentioned decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. On the contrary, the subject taxed is capital or the accretion of
capital unsevered and unrealized-probably and pragmatically never
to be realized by the stockholders. Being capital a tax thereon would
be subject to the constitutional rule of apportionment of direct taxes,
which, in turn, would make this entire scheme of taxation not only
impractical but impracticable, especially so in respect to vertical and
horizontal corporate combinations of vast intercompany stockholdings
and of numerous scattered stockholders. Of course, the states of the
union are not prevented by the federal constitution like Congress from
taxing stock dividends or other evidences of corporate earnings directly
to the stockholders. The constitutional rule of apportionment of direct
taxes does not apply to them. Possibly, but very improbably, uniform-
ity in this phase of taxation could be attained through state compacts
(with the consent of Congress) under Article 1, Section 10, Clause 3,
of the United States constitution. Congress itself might strive to gain
this necessary power to tax directly and without apportionment the
stockholders for the undistributed corporate earnings. But, this would
require a constitutional amendment. Who would dare propose it?
Would it ever be ratified?
It would seem far better that there be now imposed upon the cor-
poration one flat normal income tax comparable to the average normal
and the surtax imposed upon the individual. After putting teeth into
Section 102 (relating to surtax on corporations which improperly
accumulate surplus) and Section 351 (relating to personal holding
companies) of the 1936 Revenue Act, let them grind and cut by vig-
orous and relentless prosecutions of tax evasion cases. Relax the legal
7- Commissioner v. Mayer, 86 F. (2d) 593 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936). See also Moran
v. Lucas, 36 F. (2d) 546 (D.C. App. 1929); Torrens v. Commissioner, 31 B. T.
A. 787 (1934).
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presumptions against fraud, and intent, in tax cases, modernize the
federal court procedure according to the recent suggestions of Attorney
General Homer Cummings, make the taxpayer justify the large undis-
tributed corporate earnings or surplus by the needs and exigencies of
his particular business.
At the same time, if additional governmental revenue is needed and
not produced by the increasing improvement of business conditions
throughout the country, the wisest course seems to be to reduce the
personal exemptions and increase the normal tax rates for individuals.
This has been successfully done in England. Furthermore, taxpayers
of earned income from services rendered should be granted special and
additional tax credits. This applies especially to laborers, salary-
earners, and the professional men who are now unjustly suffering a
heavy and disproportionate tax burden. They have no compensating
allowances for depreciation; comparable advertising expenses; nor are
they permitted to deduct losses not connected with trade, business,
profit, or arising from fires, storms, shipwreck, or other casualty; they
may set up no reserves for impairment of their earning power through
sickness, accident, old age, or otherwise. On the other hand, owners
of property incomes enjoy very substantial and special tax deductions.
Now, in view of the fact that the ever-recurring federal tax prob-
lems are so complex and vital to the welfare of the people and the
administration of the government, the appointment of a special Fed-
eral Tax Commission to study constantly and report regularly on the
development of an improved national tax system co-ordinating with the
tax systems of the several states is expedient and advisable. As an
administrative body it could take sworn testimony, make investigations,
conduct hearings, collaborate with the Treasury Department, Board of
Tax Appeals, representatives of American industry and independent
tax economists. The constructive work to be done in this field of
endeavor is far beyond the mental power and physical stamina of any
single man. It requires firm collective action. But, at the same time, it
must not be forgotten that confidence is inspired by the continuity
and stability of a sound, adequate, certain, convenient, and just tax
system. Hasty tax experiments embodying drastic retroactive provi-
sions and sudden radical changes jeopardize American business, en-
danger the smooth flow of necessary government revenue and cast
heavy and unjust burdens upon the people. Nevertheless, even the most
ardent exponents of the 1936 Revenue Act must admit that there is
vast room for improvement in the present law.
